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Housing and Measurement of Inflation Rate
There are four approaches to the treatment of housing, including 
owner-occupied housing, in the consumer price index, depending 
on whether the goods or services are “used,” “consumed,” “paid” or 
“acquired,” namely (1) user cost, (2) rental equivalent, (3) payments 
and (4) net acquisition methods. 
The first two methods seem appropriate for the measuring of the 
“cost of living,” as they cover the consumption of the service pro-
duced by housing. The payments method reflects the actual outlay 
for owning a dwelling for shelter purposes; it can be regarded as a 
simplified version of the user cost method. The user cost method, 
as adopted by Canada and Sweden, includes the opportunity cost of 
owning a dwelling (the interest rate) and expected changes in house 
prices, in addition to relative price of houses, depreciation, tax, re-
pairs and maintenance.1 There is an issue as to whether we should 
include the price of the land in the calculation of user cost, an issue 
which has important policy implications for the transmission mecha-
nism of monetary policy in the case of Japan.
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On the other hand, if we want “household monetary expenditure” 
to be reflected in the CPI, then the net acquisition method (in the 
sense of excluding the transaction of existing dwellings) may be pre-
ferred, since this treats the purchase of housing the same as for du-
rable consumer goods. This method also may involve including the 
asset component in the CPI, of particular relevance if the land is 
included (Eiglsperger 2006).
In Japan, we adopt the rental equivalent method in the measure-
ment of inflation rate, as is the case in the U.S. and five of the EU 
countries. The rental equivalent method estimates the costs for own-
er-occupied housing services with reference to rental payments for 
similar rental houses. There remains an issue as to whether the paid 
rent is considered fully representative of the imputed rent, because of 
the difference in quality and floor-size distribution.2
Equivalent rent has continued to decline in recent months, despite 
the recovery in land prices. The movement in housing rent seems to 
be associated more with sticky wages than with land prices, which 
show large swings (Chart 1). This may reflect a stable share of shelter 
costs in the household budget. Due to the large share of housing 
services in the consumer price index (17%), as well as the weak devel-
opment in wages since the end of 2006 (Chart 2), service prices have 
moved around zero, in sharp contrast with other developed econo-
mies where they hover around 3-4%.3 
Asset Price Aspect: Future Price Index or Wealth Price Index
Housing has two aspects for consumers; it renders housing services 
like other durable goods, and at the same time, houses for rent or 
owner-occupied houses are held as assets. These two aspects provide 
us with an interesting insight into current and future price indexes. 
Housing as an asset produces housing service for the future. More-
over, the fundamental price of housing is equal to the present value 
of future housing service stream. If we attach importance to the asset 
aspect of housing, it seems natural to ask whether we can extract a 
signal or guide to future price developments from the movement of 
asset prices. Housing and Monetary Policy in Japan  447
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Alchian and Klein (1973) proposed the construction of an “inter-
temporal cost of living index,” under the constant utility level, based 
on individuals’ intertemporal optimization behavior, by using the 
data on all tangible and non-tangible assets in the economy. This idea 
of an intertemporal cost of living index, or “wealth price index,”can 
be traced back to I. Fisher (1906).
Shibuya (1992) attempted to calculate just such a wealth price in-
dex. He named it the “dynamic equilibrium price index,” based on 
the assumption that the economy moves along a balanced growth 
path (the “modified golden rule path”). After constructing the wealth 
price index as the weighted geometric mean of current product price 
inflation (GDP deflator) and future price changes represented by ag-
gregate asset price of the national wealth in the national accounts, 
he argued that the BOJ could have envisaged future inflation if the 
wealth price index had been employed in the mid-1980s, in addition 
to the conventional CPI (Chart 3). 
Shiratsuka (1999) carried out the Granger causality test and con-
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price index as an information variable, although he also reported that 
its usefulness depends on the sources of asset price changes and the 
macroeconomic environment.
There are, however, a number of shortcomings with the dynamic 
equilibrium price index if we want to employ it as one of the impor-
tant information variables in conducting monetary policy. 
First, human wealth is omitted in the calculation of total assets, de-
spite the fact that, in Japan, the total value of human capital is about 
three times larger than that of non-human capital in the household 
sector’s wealth (Iwata 1992). 
Second, there is the problem of sizable observation errors with the 
aggregate asset price, as compared with the CPI or the GDP deflator, 
in addition to the two-year delay in the availability of data. 
Third, the wealth price index is constructed based on two assump-
tions, namely that the asset price is equal to the fundamental price on 
a balanced growth path and that the marginal productivity of aggre-
gate asset remains constant, disregarding the composition change in 
the national wealth. If these two assumptions are untenable, then the 
index derived may fail to provide useful information on future price 
developments. We cannot escape from the identification problem as-
sociated with asset price bubbles. 
If we look at the calculated DEPI, we find that it is strongly in-
fluenced by movements in the price of land, because of the large 
weight of land value in the national wealth; it is about half of nation-
al wealth, and the proportion of land value for residential use is about 
four times larger than the value of residential structures in 2005. 
Despite these shortcomings, it may be useful to carry out a model 
simulation of the balanced path to show the deviation of the ob-
served DEPI from the model simulation outcome. Furthermore, it 
seems to be important to observe directly the price of land, and ex-
amine the factors and sources of price movements, to draw useful 
information for monetary policy implementation, because land price 
plays an important role in the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy in Japan. 450  Kazumasa Iwata
Land as Collateral
One of the important differences between housing and other du-
rable goods is that the use of land is essential for producing housing 
services. In the case of Japan, the value of land accounts for a larger 
share in residential property and the national wealth than in other 
advanced economies.
Land has been employed as the most important collateral for bank 
lending. It also constitutes one of the most popular properties for in-
heritance, due to the lower effective tax rate applied to land holdings 
than to other assets.
Some economists have argued that the Japanese bank-dominated 
financial system was based on the “land standard” during the “high 
growth era,” because of the importance of land as collateral. The 
price of land in Japan had increased persistently in the period from 
the 1950s to the bursting of the land-price bubble in the early 1990s, 
with a short interruption in the mid-1970s (Chart 4). The price of 
land has often deviated from the fundamental price, due to the lack 
of information, high transaction costs and the mistaken perception 
of land as an asset of ever-increasing value. 
The total land value became five times larger than nominal GDP at 
the peak of the bubble period (Chart 5), despite the fact that the his-
torical average of the ratio is about 2. In addition, the insight derived 
from the neoclassical growth model, including land as a production 
factor, indicates a much lower ratio. According to my own estimates, 
it ranges from 1.4 to 2 as Japan experiences an aging and decline in 
its population (Iwata and Hattori 2003).4 
Asset Price Bubble and Option Theory
An asset price bubble will emerge through the financial accelerator 
mechanism based on various frictions and the incompleteness on the 
financial market, combined with the excessive provision of liquidity 
and the euphoria brought about by expectations of higher growth. In 
addition, the mispricing of option values attached to land and mort-
gage loans may lead to an asset price bubble and aggravate the effect 
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Land itself can be put to many different uses, such as residential, 
non-residential and commercial use. Lax zoning regulation creates 
the possibility of land being converted to more intensive and profit-
able use. In this case, the price of land consists of the fundamen-
tal price and the option value of conversion to more profitable use. 
The option value resembles a convertible bond (Kanoh and Murase 
1999). If the option premium is overpriced under the perception of 
ever-rising land value, the option value for convertible use of land 
may give rise to accelerated land prices; it has, in fact, been observed 
that residential land prices follow the acceleration of commercial use 
land prices. The price of commercial land in Japan’s major cities has 
risen more than 10% recently.
From the perspective of option theory, housing loans are more 
complicated financial instruments than at first might appear. They 
incorporate call options in the case of prepayment (to buy the asset), 
as well as put options in the case of bankruptcy (to sell the asset).5 
Profs. Pavlov and Wachter (2006) have pointed out the possibility 
of the underpricing of default risk in all non-recourse asset-backed 
mortgage loans, due to inappropriate deposit insurance schemes and 
the asymmetry of information. The underpricing of default risk or 
distorted put option values may lead to inflated asset prices and cause 
far deeper asset market crashes. Moreover, default risk is easily under-
estimated against a backdrop of rising house prices. 
In addition, there is a risk that in the process of securitizing mort-
gage loans such as CDOs, the default risk can be further underpriced 
by rating agencies in the assessment of correlation of default risks 
among the bundle of different mortgage loans. The use of mark-
to-model instead of mark-to-market in complex structured products 
may also lead to the wide-scale underpricing.
Inflation and Asset Price Bubble
On the relationship between the inflation rate and asset prices, the 
above-trend rise in land value relative to nominal GDP indicated 
clearly the emergence of a bubble after 1987. The weak corporate Housing and Monetary Policy in Japan  453
governance of borrowing firms, coupled with a weakening of the 
monitoring function of main banks, which were relying on land as 
collateral, gave rise to a positive association of asset price rise with 
higher leverage ratio. 
Yet at that time, core CPI (excluding fresh food) was close to zero. 
This is partly due to the sharp appreciation of the yen rate after the 
Plaza Accord in 1985, coupled with the oil price decline (Chart 6). 
Further, the October crash in 1987 reinforced the need for inter-
national cooperation on the provision of liquidity for Japan as the 
largest creditor country.
On the excessive provision of liquidity, we can say that the sustained 
deviation of actual real money stock from the equilibrium real money 
stock (real money gap) after the mid-1980s, created the circumstances 
where the asset price bubble could easily emerge (Iwata 2006). 
In addition, real estate-related loans by unsupervised non-banks 
(the special housing finance companies) increased massively. It seems 
noteworthy that the policy measure limiting real estate-related loans 
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At this Jackson Hole conference in 1999, Chairman Bernanke and 
Prof. Gertler argued that the adoption of a “flexible inflation targeting” 
policy may have prevented both the emergence of the asset price bubble 
at an early stage and the financial instability at a later stage, even though 
the monetary policy had not directly targeted asset prices. Former Dep-
uty Governor Yamaguchi (1999) commented on their paper, saying that, 
“I don’t see how a central bank can increase interest to 8 or 10% when 
we don’t have inflation at all.” 
Giavazzi and Mishkin (2006) also pointed out that, “the serious 
mistake that a central bank makes is not failing to stop a bubble, but 
is rather not responding fast enough after a bubble bursts.”6 
I feel inclined towards the indirect approach to asset prices; namely 
that monetary policy should be oriented toward enhancing price sta-
bility and smoothing fluctuations in GDP gap, while refraining from 
targeting asset prices directly, given the limited knowledge to cor-
rectly detect fundamental asset prices. 
There are a number of hurdles before a direct or preemptive ap-
proach can be adopted. These include the identification of a bubble, 
serious macroeconomic consequences (such as a severe financial crisis 
after the bubble bursts), the adequacy of using interest rate policy to 
deflate the bubble, and public support. However, I am not yet fully 
convinced by the argument that all the problems Japan faced at that 
time would have been solved alone by the adoption of a flexible infla-
tion targeting policy. 
Lessons from the Asset Price Bubble of the 1980s
Now let me draw several lessons from the boom and bust of asset 
prices in the latter half of the 1980s. 
First, we should give priority to price stability as a policy objective 
over the apprehension of exchange rate fluctuations and the external 
imbalance. At that time, Japan’s current account surplus, coupled 
with the U.S. deficit, was perceived to be one of the major macro-
economic policy issues, although the theoretical underpinning for 
rectifying the external imbalance was not solid enough.7 Moreover, a Housing and Monetary Policy in Japan  455
proposal on targeting the exchange rate was seriously debated in an 
attempt to solve the current account imbalance.8
Second, we should put emphasis on the need to deal with the 
euphoria brought about by higher expected growth and the sharp 
drop in “finance premium” during the bubble period. The increas-
ing collateral value compressed the finance premium for real estate 
and corporate borrowing. The aggressive risk-taking was facilitated 
by financial deregulation and the higher than expected growth rate 
under price stability, in part due to mistaken perceptions of future 
technological progress (Chart 7). 
Today, we see a similar problem with low term- and risk premia, 
which constitute one of the causes of the “conundrum of global low 
long-term interest rates.” We observe that the real long-term interest 
rate among major advanced economies has tended recently to con-
verge at around 2% (Chart 8). 
Given the low term- and risk premia across various financial mar-
kets, the low real long-term rate implies that any country which has 
a higher than expected growth rate, significantly above 2%, is liable 
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Third, it may be useful to extract a signal or guide to future price 
developments from asset price changes by examining the factors and 
the sources of asset bubbles, to the extent that there exist various 
distortions and imperfections in financial markets. Although it may 
be desirable to have an intertemporal cost of living index, this might 
not help us in the near future. It is possible instead to show the likely 
consequence of deviation of asset price from the historical trend or 
the simulated fundamental price based on models. It is interesting 
to note that the OECD (2005, 2006) identified the deviation of the 
actual rent-to-price ratio from the fundamental ratio based on the 
long-term historical average ratio, employing the inverse of user cost 
as a proxy to the price-to-rent ratio, as the user cost equates the ex-
pected cost of owning a house with the cost of renting. Further, the 
OECD estimated the nearing of a peak to real house prices, if inter-
est rates were to rise further.10 
Fourth, prudential policy is an essential policy tool in order to 
avoid the financial instability arising from a boom and bust in as-
set prices. Such policy can contribute to preventing excessive risk-
taking by financial institutions; it may be appropriate to strengthen 
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loans in the U.S., more than half of the loans were provided by un-
supervised mortgage companies.
The stress test on the above-trend rise in land prices and the decline 
to the trend can be used to indicate future damage to the financial 
system. By using the data available at the end of March 1990, the 
credit risk was estimated to amount to about ¥22.8 trillion under the 
assumption of a bursting bubble and a deterioration in the credit sit-
uation of the related industries (Shimizu and Shiratsuka 2000). The 
publication of “Financial System Report” may serve to send warning 
signals on excessive risk-taking by financial institutions.
Conclusion
Given the asset price boom and bust in the latter half of the 1980s, 
and the subsequent persistent deflation after 1998, the “new policy 
framework for the conduct of monetary policy” was announced in 
March 2006. Aside from the first perspective, which examines the 
likely development within forecast period, the new policy framework 
incorporated as a second perspective an examination of potential risks 
beyond the forecast period. Today, we observe that land prices have 
bottomed out with the significant rise in the price of commercial 
land, while the core CPI hovers around zero against a background of 
rising utilization ratio and a tightening of labor market conditions. 
We must recall that behind the aggressive risk-taking in the latter half 
of the 1980s there was the market perception of long-sustained low 
interest rates for the future under price stability. It may be useful to 
carry out an exercise to demonstrate the consequences of long-sus-
tained low interest rates and the financial imbalance on the future de-
velopment of economic activity and prices. This may further clarify 
the role and merits of the two perspectives under price stability on a 
longer time horizon than the forecast period.458  Kazumasa Iwata
Endnotes
1The user cost of housing can be derived from the intertemporal maximiza-
tion of utility function by households, whereby, the utility function comprises 
various goods and services, including housing services. However, it is somewhat 
uncomfortable for central bankers to include the real market interest rate in the 
measurement of inflation rate, as is the case of mortgage interest payment in the 
payments method. Further, the possibility of reselling houses makes the calcula-
tion of the user costs of housing capital more complicated, because it involves the 
issue of the optimal choice of timing of reselling under the diversified tax system 
on capital gains.
2In addition, due to regulations and the different tax treatments for rental and 
owner-occupied houses, there is a selection bias in measuring the implicit rent of 
owner-occupied houses. 
3The weak development of wages in recent months can be attributed to the 
retirement of the first baby boomers, who number about 8 million and who are 
being replaced by young workers or reemployed as part-time workers; public sector 
wage cuts introduced to consolidate the budget balance; and the restructuring at 
smaller, non-manufacturing firms with low productivity. The final factor is related 
to the distortion of relative wages, which Hayek (1975) described as “one of the 
basic elementary connections between wages and investment wholly overlooked in 
Keynesian economics.” 
4The steady state ratio of total land value to nominal GDP can be expressed as 
the product of the time preference rate, the expected population growth rate and 
the share of land rent in national income. Given the values of 3% for the time 
preference, 1% growth rate for population and 5% land rent share, the steady state 
ratio is 2.5. A much lower ratio is suggested for aging and declining populations, 
when compared with high growth periods (Iwata and Hattori 2003).
5The  housing  loans  provided  by  the  Public  Housing  Finance  Corporation 
(PHFC) suffered losses due to massive prepayment during the periods of declining 
interest rates. Iwata and Hattori (1999) estimated prepayment costs amounting to 
¥215 billion, based on the model of the call option premium attached to housing 
loans provided by the PHFC. Now the risk of prepayment is borne by investors, 
instead of taxpayers, through securitizing the housing loan by the new corporation 
after the abolition of the PHFC.
6Giavazzi and Mishkin further mentioned, as the second lesson, the procrastina-
tion on the part of the Japanese government in restoring the health of the financial 
system after the bubble burst.
7Iwata (1991) carried out a simulation exercise on the future development of 
the U.S.-Japan external imbalance based on the overlapping generations model in 
an open economy. The simulation results showed the possibility of long-sustained 
imbalance until the mid-2020s, mainly reflecting economic fundamentals such as Housing and Monetary Policy in Japan  459
the difference between the two countries in saving ratio, productivity and popula-
tion growth rate.  
8According to Prof. Taylor (2007), the exchange rate policy of the U.S. govern-
ment is today guided by several principles: (1) it must be supported by sound do-
mestic policies, (2) it should rely on markets with a minimum of intervention, (3) 
it should minimize verbal intervention, (4) there is a need for a financial diplomacy 
strategy, and (5) it should take due account of international political and security 
issues. These principles, notably the second principle, seem to be different from the 
exchange rate targeting proposal. Prof. McCallum (2007) regards the separation 
by government of exchange rate policy and monetary policy as an anachronism, 
because of the linkage of exchange rate and interest rates within the general equi-
librium framework.
9An alternative explanation of the conundrum attributes it to the “global saving 
glut.” The real long-term interest rate largely reflects the global saving-investment 
balance. This begs the following question: To what extent does the saving-invest-
ment balance deviate from the equilibrium balance? For instance, corporate man-
agers in advanced economies behave rather cautiously on the expansion of business 
investment despite ample corporate savings. China seems to expand fixed invest-
ment in an excessive manner, yet domestic savings exceed domestic investments. In 
both cases it seems difficult to identify the degree of excess saving. 
10On the relationship between real economic activity and asset prices, there is a 
tendency for the boom and bust in business fixed investment to be associated with 
boom and bust in land prices. Actually, the elasticity of substitution of capital for 
land is greater than one in postwar Japan. Yet the movements in land prices explain 
little in the movements of business fixed investment (Kiyotaki and West 2004). 460  Kazumasa Iwata
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